Voters who participate in elections to the European Parliament (EP) apparently use these elections to punish their domestic governing parties. Many students of the EU therefore claim that the party-political composition of the Parliament should systematically differ from that of the EU Council. This study shows that opposed majorities between council and parliament may have other than simply electoral causes. The logic of domestic government formation works against the representation of more extreme and EU-skeptic parties in the Council, whereas voters in EP elections vote more often for these parties. The different locations of Council and Parliament are therefore caused by two effects: a mechanical effect-relevant for the composition of the Council-when national votes are translated into office and an electoral effect in European elections. The article discusses the implications of this finding for our understanding of the political system of the EU and of its democratic legitimacy.
Introduction
We know from a rich literature on European elections (Eijk & Franklin, 1996; Marsh, 1998; Reif & Schmitt, 1980 ) that the outcomes of European elections differ systematically from those of national elections. Parties in government at the national level tend to systematically lose shares of the vote in the elections to the European Parliament, or EP, whereas opposition parties, small parties, and ideologically more extreme parties tend to gain greater shares of the vote than in the previous national contest. For many scholars, this implies that political majorities in the EU Council and in the European Parliament differ systematically from each other-a situation similar to the divided government between the U.S. Congress and the president because of the midterm cycle effect or to the diverging majorities between Bundestag and the second chamber, the Bundesrat, in Germany. This comparison at least has been frequently invoked. Already in 1997, one of the authors of the influential "second order election" thesis pointed to one of its "less often . . . discussed" implications:
Second Order Elections have a practically inevitable structural effect on composite political systems with two different institutions which participate in legislation. The one of the two originating from second-order elections (in the EC/EU, the European Parliament) tends to have a majority that is opposed to the one originating from first-order elections (in the EC/EU, the Council). This renders co-legislation more difficult. (Reif, 1997, p. 120) Similarly, Simon Hix (2005) claims that "because EP elections are lost by parties in government and won by parties in opposition, 'divided government' is the norm in the EU" (p. 206), and Stefano Bartolini (2006) contends that "divided government in the form of different partisan orientations of the Council versus the Commission/Parliament will be a permanent reality" in the European Union (p. 40). 1 Whereas the divided-government conjecture has been frequently invoked by students of the European Union, the underlying causal mechanisms are in need of clarification, and systematic empirical evidence for "opposed majorities" between Council and Parliament has still to be provided. In all accounts, the electoral nexus, that is, the different voting behavior in national and European elections, has been made responsible for divided government in the EU, but as we will show, diverging majorities between Council and Parliament can also be produced by different mechanics of vote aggregation. In his lucid discussion of divided government, Joseph Colomer (2001, p. 161) has pointed out that in a bicameral system, different majorities in the first and second chamber may come about even if each voter has voted for exactly the same party at first and second chamber elections-and exactly the same voters turned out in both elections. As Colomer argues, first and second chamber may differ in their party-political composition despite identical votes whenever the formulas that translate votes into seats differ for both chambers. We think that these mechanical rather than electoral causes for diverging majorities are particularly relevant in the case of the European Union.
In the EU, governments are represented in the Council, whereas parties are represented in the European Parliament. In other words, the political composition of the Council incurs one additional step in the translation of votes into seats: National votes are first translated into seats in the national parliament, and the majority in parliament then determines the national executive (which determines the composition of the Council). This, we claim, has an important consequence for our understanding of divided government in the EU: More extreme parties will be represented in the EP once they pass national electoral thresholds in European elections. Yet given that they rarely participate in national governments, they are unlikely to be represented in the Council. In other words, possible distances between the party-political location of the Council and of the European Parliament may be the result of two distinct, but possibly related, effects: Voters in EP elections are more likely to vote for politically extreme parties, whereas at the same time, politically more extreme parties are less likely to take part in national government (and we cannot rule out the possibility that some voters are more likely to vote extreme in EP elections because extreme parties are less likely to be represented in the Council; see below).
As we argue in the following sections, to understand the political dynamics of divided government in the political system of the EU, it is of crucial importance to distinguish between its mechanical and electoral causes and to take into account the two salient dimensions of European politics: the left-right dimension and the European integration-versus-national sovereignty dimension (see Section 4 for a discussion of the dimensionality of Europe's political space). As we will show below, the mechanical cause of divided government in the EU leads to systematic differences in the pro-/ contra-EU dimension between Council and Parliament-because of the lower probability that more extreme, that is, more EU-skeptic, parties are represented in national governments and therefore in the Council. The consequences of the electoral cause of divided government are less clear-cut. First of all, it remains an empirical question whether the second-order status of European elections actually does lead to divided government "the European way." Much depends on the overall party-political composition of EU member-state governments. Second, without further analysis, we cannot say for certain whether voting behavior in EP elections reflects voters' choices in the traditional left-right or in the pro-/contra-EU dimension.
The article proceeds in three stages. In the following section (Section 2), we first highlight the importance of diverging majorities for interinstitutional politics and policy making within the EU. We then subsequently detail (Section 3) how the logic of national government formation translates into a pro-EU bias of the European Council through the exclusion of more EU-skeptic parties from domestic governments. We also briefly summarize the literature on the second-order status of elections to the European Parliament and outline its expected effect on the party-political composition of EP and Council. In Section 4, we empirically compare the spatial location of Council and Parliament in the two salient dimensions of European politics, in the European integration-versus-national sovereignty dimension and the traditional left-right dimension. We conclude (Section 5) by emphasizing the implications of our findings for future research on European elections, for the debate on Europe's democratic deficit, and for interinstitutional politics within the EU.
The Consequences of Divided Government for Interinstitutional Politics in the European Union
Systematic differences between the party leanings of Council and Parliament should be of considerable relevance for Europe's interinstitutional politics. A different party-political composition of Council and EP would have considerable consequences for European legislative politics, given that today the codecision procedure requires the approval of both Council and EP for the vast majority of all legislative initiatives (Corbett, Jacobs, & Shackleton, 2003) . Marked differences in the party complexion of the Council and the Parliament would possibly lead to government or opposition dynamics between the two major legislative actors and could develop into a source of interinstitutional conflict (Aspinwall, 2002; Ringe, 2005) . Furthermore, larger variation within the EP's party-political complexion may make it more difficult to meet the qualified majority requirements of the cooperation and codecision procedures. 2 With the significantly increased role of the European Parliament in EU legislation, many see the European Union as having developed into a "classical two-chamber legislature" (Hix, 2005, p. 72) or as having already established a "bicameral legislative authority" (Corbett et al., 2003, p. 183; Tsebelis & Garrett, 2001, p. 359) . The codecision procedure was first introduced with the Maastricht Treaty (Codecision I) and then modified and strengthened with the Amsterdam Treaty (Codecision II) and the Draft Constitutional Treaty. With the Constitutional Treaty, the codecision procedure was supposed to become the "ordinary legislative procedure" (Articles I-33 [1] and III-302), and it was planned to extend it to such sensitive issue areas as agriculture and fisheries, asylum and immigration law, and structural and cohesion funds (Craig, 2004, p. 3) . Already, the procedure applies to more than 50% of all EU primary legislation (Corbett et al., 2003, p. 187) . With codecision, Parliament and Council have to agree to a given initiative before it can become law. If either of the two fails to give its consent, the conference committee has to find a solution within 8 weeks; otherwise an initiative will not become law. Obviously, under codecision, conflicts between Parliament and Council become more likely, with an increasing distance between their party-political centers of gravity. In all probability, EP amendments to Commission proposals will be proposed more frequently, and the conference committee will be invoked more often, the more the political complexion of Parliament and Council diverges.
The spatial location and internal cohesiveness of Council and Parliament have also obvious implications for the degree of autonomy of the Commission, because preference convergence between Council and European Parliament "would reduce" the Commission's "scope of discretion in implementation and adjudication" of EU legislation (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2001, p. 380) . Put another way, the more heterogeneous Parliament and Council are, the stronger the bureaucratic drift of the Commission can be expected to be (Pollack, 2003) . Obviously, these considerations pertain not only to interinstitutional, especially legislative, politics, but they also affect constitutional conflicts within the European Community.
Take for example the EP's right to approve a new Commission. Because of several treaty provisions, but also because of Parliament's extensive interpretation of its constitutional role that later became accepted by Council and Commission, the EP today enjoys the right to approve or censure the Commission (Corbett et al., 2003, pp. 230-233) . Moreover, synchronized terms of Parliament and Commission have further strengthened the role of Parliament in the Commission nomination and investiture process. The resignation of the Santer Commission and the nomination of the Barroso Commission provided us with initial evidence of the increasing importance of government opposition dynamics between Commission and Parliament (cf. Ringe, 2005) . Conflicts during the Commission nomination procedure may also become more likely because member states increasingly nominate politicians of the nationally governing party (parties) as commissioners for Brussels (Döring, 2007) , possibly also because political majorities between the EP and the Council are diverging more and more.
However, once installed, the Commission may be more autonomous because it is able to exploit the divergences in the party-political complexion of Council and Parliament-something that would make the conflict between Parliament and Council over the concrete composition of the Commission only more contentious.
Finally, as already briefly mentioned, different party-political centers of gravity between Council and Parliament would also have important implications for our understanding of EP elections. One recurrent feature of European elections has been that voters who participate in them tend to punish their domestic parties of government by voting more often for opposition parties and for ideologically more extreme parties. In the literature on European elections, this has been interpreted as proving that European elections are not really about European politics but first and foremost about domestic politics (cf. Reif & Schmitt, 1980) . Systematic differences in outcomes between European elections and national general elections are then mainly attributed to the second-order status of European elections, in which the composition of the national executive is not at stake-which might motivate voters to cast a different vote in EP elections than in first-order domestic elections.
However, vote loss by governing parties in elections to the European Parliament is "also consistent with the interpretation suggesting that those who are worried by further steps in integration deem the incumbent government responsible for supporting them" (Bartolini, 2005, p. 343) . The European voter may be even more worried if he or she has the-largely correct (see below)-impression that his or her concerns are systematically underrepresented at the European level through the exclusion of more EUskeptic parties from the Council. In other words, the systematic vote losses of governing parties may have more European causes than as yet suggested by the literature.
But how realistic is the divided government scenario in Europe? Can we actually observe opposed majorities in the Council and the EP? Currently, the literature on EU decision making provides us with little systematic information on the party positions and majorities in different EU institutions. Yet recent empirical studies show the relevance of party conflict for decision processes in the Council (Mattila, 2004) and the EP (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2005) . But do we find empirical evidence for situations of divided government in the European Union? Before we answer these questions, we will first describe the mechanical and electoral causes of divided government in the EU in more detail.
National Government Formation and European Elections: Mechanical and Electoral Causes of Divided Government in the EU
Let us start with a brief empirical description of domestic patterns of coalition formation and how they affect the party-political representation in the Council. Martin and Stevenson (2001) , in what is as of yet the most extensive empirical analysis of the determinants of government formation in Western democracies, highlight certain regularities with important consequences for our study. Their most relevant finding for our context is that parties in the center of the left-right spectrum participate more often in government than parties with more extreme positions. This is a natural implication of the median party theorem that predicts that in a one-dimensional policy space, the median legislator is part of any majority government coalition (Laver & Shepsle, 1996) . The extensive literature that discusses different theoretical models of government formation agrees that policy-driven coalitions will always include some moderate party as a pivotal player. Given that parties in a coalition also tend to have associated positions on a left-right scale, we rarely find coalitions that include both left and right extreme parties. Moreover, the largest party in Parliament is most likely to become the formateur of the government. Again, large parties tend to be more centrist than small parties; rarely are they to be found on extreme positions of the left-right scale. Martin and Stevenson (2001) found strong confirmation for all of these expected patterns of government composition when they tested various coalition formation theories on their extensive data set relating to postwar government formation in Western Europe. One of their strongest empirical findings is of particular relevance for our argument: Parties located near the extremes of the left-right continuum have a significantly lower probability of being a member of government than parties with a centrist position (cf. Warwick, 1996 ).
Yet we also know from studies of party positions toward European integration that more extreme political parties tend to be more skeptical toward European integration than more centrist parties (Aspinwall, 2002; Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002) . The party positions in the EU policy space are often described as U-or hump shaped (see also next section). Figure 1 presents this well-known fact but adds information on the parties' government status. Figure 1 makes the consequences for the composition of the European Council immediately apparent. Because parties that are more EU-friendlyparties with moderate left-right positions-are more likely to be part of a member state's government, the Council should be, on average, significantly more integration-friendly than national parliaments, on average, are. As Figure 1 shows, the much lower government participation rate of more extreme and therefore also more EU-skeptic parties should lead to a mechanical effect on the representation of pro-/contra-EU preferences when votes are translated into government positions. That this expectation is indeed borne out by the data can be demonstrated by a simple comparison of two measures: the party-political center of gravity (CoG; Gross & Sigelman, 1984) in the integration-national sovereignty dimension of the EU member-state parliaments compared to the CoG in this dimension of the national governments or, for that matter, the Council. As Figure 2 shows, once we calculate the seat-weighted positions of those parties that are represented in the national parliaments and compare them to the seat-weighted positions of those parties in government, we see that member-state parliaments have been systematically more EU-skeptic than member-state governments. 4 Translating votes into seats in office (government positions) apparently biases political representation in Europe in favor of EU-friendly parties. The electoral reasons for differences in the party-political complexion of Council and European Parliament have been discussed much more extensively and prominently than their potential mechanical causes. This electoral effect is widely known in the literature as the so-called secondorder effect of EP elections. The many election studies about the six direct elections to the European Parliament presently held have provided us with extensive knowledge that outcomes of EP elections deviate systematically from the outcomes of national elections. Ever since the early pioneering articles by Reif and Schmitt (1980) and Reif (1984) , three patterns in EP elections have been highlighted and, by and large, confirmed in subsequent studies. First, government parties tend to lose vote shares in European elections compared to the last national contest. Second, both small parties and more extreme parties gain votes compared to their previous domestic electoral performance. Third, these regular vote share shifts seem more pronounced when the European election is held in the middle of the domestic legislative term, whereas EP elections held shortly after or shortly before national elections produce less substantial deviations from the domestic electoral outcomes (Eijk & Franklin, 1996) . How is this pattern explained? The answer usually comes in two parts. First, although some voters use European elections to vote on European issues, most seem to want to send an electoral signal to the central political players within their national political arena. Second, because electoral rules, election dates, the set of parties that compete for votes, and-most important-what is at stake politically differ between national and European elections, voting behavior differs as well. 5 In particular, although national general elections establish the national executive (first-order elections), in EP elections and other so-called second-order elections, there seems to be less at stake. Voters therefore might just care less (lower turnout) or they might vote differently because they do not need to worry about the consequences of their vote for (domestic) government formation or, indeed, about possibly "wasting" it.
Obviously, if voters cast different votes in national and in European elections, the political composition of those European institutions determined either by the one or by the other can be expected to differ as well. If voters switch votes systematically, these differences in the party-political composition should be systematic as well. This is the background against which "divided government as the norm" expectations have been formulated (see above). But closer inspection shows that the consequences of the secondorder effect are not as straightforward as often claimed; nor are opposed majorities between Council and EP as "inevitable" (Reif, 1997, p. 120) as is often suggested. Even if a substantial proportion of the electorate in the EU member states switches votes between domestic first-order and European second-order elections, the aggregate effect of vote switching would still depend on the party complexion of all EU member-state governments at any given time.
Let us assume-as a thought experiment-that half of all EU member states are led by left parties, whereas right parties govern the other half. If voters use European elections to punish their domestic government, the relative vote losses of left and right government parties may roughly cancel each other out. 6 In other words, whether divided government is the norm in the EU, whether the EP's political CoG has persistently differed from that of the Council, is an empirical question, one that to the best of our knowledge has not been systematically addressed so far. It is to this more detailed empirical evidence that we would like to turn now. In the next section, we present our CoG estimates for the EP and the Council on both the traditional left-right divide and on the pro-/contra-EU dimension since 1979.
Divided Government in Europe? The Party-Political Centers of Gravity of the Council and the EP, 1979 to 2004
Do the mechanical and electoral effects that influence the composition of EU institutions lead to "opposed majorities" between Council and Parliament? Does the European Union establish a system of divided government? And if so, opposed in which dimension: in the left-right or in the national sovereignty-versus-European integration dimension?
Scholars today largely agree that an economic left-right dimension and attitudes toward European integration are the most important dimensions of ideological contestation in the EU. Marks and Steenbergen (2002) summarize the different theoretical debates on the issue and demonstrate how different theories highlight the importance of these two dimensions. McElroy and Benoit (2007, p. 14) provide evidence from a recent expert survey that contains information on the spatial location and issue salience of party positions. Again, results demonstrate that the economic left-right dimension and attitudes toward EU integration are the most salient dimensions of party competition in Europe. Recently, Hooghe and Marks (in press) in their study based on individual survey data and Kriesi (2007) in a content analysis of parties' election statements could confirm the existence of a second dimension in European politics that is independent of the traditional left-right dimension: a "cultural" dimension representing the conflict between the protection of national sovereignty and further European integration. We will therefore focus on these two dimensions in our subsequent analyses of divided government in the EU.
To determine the party composition of national parliaments and governments, we have used the data by Mackie and Rose (1991) ; Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2000) ; the yearly data reports of the European Journal of Political Research; and various Internet sources. 7 For the European Parliament, we have used the election results provided in Corbett et al. (2003, pp. 308-313) . To locate parties, and therefore the Council and the EP, in political space, we have taken as data sources the "Marks/Steenbergen 1999 dataset" and the "2002 Chapel Hill party expert dataset" 8 on the left-right positions of political parties and their positions on European integration.
We will not engage here in an extended methodological debate about the pros and cons of expert surveys versus content analysis data such as that generated by the Comparative Manifesto Project (see Marks, 2007) . The basic trade-off between these two data sources seems to be one between Manow, Döring / Causes of Divided Government 1359 coverage (in time and thus also with respect to the parties covered) and reliability. Given that our period of investigation starts relatively late with the first direct election to the EP in 1979, coverage is less of a problem in our context, which strongly speaks in favor of using the more reliable expert survey data. Moreover, the left-right dimension has been validated for the manifesto data and expert surveys, whereas the integrationindependence dimension has been much better validated for the expert surveys. Latest evidence suggests that expert surveys provide us with considerably better estimates of parties' positions on European integration (Marks, Hooghe, Steenbergen, & Bakker, 2007) .
We measure the ideological position of political institutions using the CoG concept (Gross & Sigelman, 1984) . The CoG is the weighted mean of the positions of all parties in the institution being studied. An alternative, and possibly more appealing, indicator theoretically would be the position of the median party. Powell (2006, p. 303 ) discusses in much more detail the pros and cons of different indicators-median, majority party, veto player, and weighted mean-as estimators for the position of multiparty governments. We follow his arguments in favor of choosing the weighted mean, that is, CoG, but also apply this concept when calculating the political position of national parliaments and the EP. We weight with the number of seats in the national parliament and the EP, respectively.
9
With the CoG, we can compare the spatial locations of national parliaments, the Council, and the EP (cf. Manow, Schäfer, & Zorn, in press ), a comparison that allows us to assess the representativeness of these European bodies with respect to the political composition of national parliaments (Powell, 2000) . We abstain from identifying the positions of pivotal countries under different decision rules (qualified majority rule or unanimity) with the position of the Council, because our focus is on how voters' preferences are represented in the Council and the EP. Taking the formal rules of European decision making systematically into account is beyond the scope of this article. We hasten to add that accounting for decision rules (under different locations of the status quo) promises to be a very important extension of our analysis that may generate systematic insights into the potential for gridlock between Council and Parliament given their varying party-political composition over time (cf. Krehbiel, 1998) . 10 We must leave this important analysis to future studies.
To understand the party composition of EU institutions, we first would like to compare the positions of national parliaments, national governments (i.e., the Council), and the European Parliament in the left-right dimension. In parliamentary democracies, the government is usually located either to the left or to the right of the parliament's mean. This is because of the simple fact that a government coalition constitutes a subset of the parties in parliament that is likely to deviate from the mean parliamentary position. Although being to the left or right of the parliament's mean, a governing coalition is also ideologically more homogeneous than the parliament as a whole. If political competition is not distorted, the CoGs of subsequent governments should fluctuate around the parliamentary mean. In other words, we would not expect a systematic and persistent difference between the left-right position of governments and parliaments; translating parliamentary seats into government positions should produce no systematic bias in the left-right dimension.
Moreover, for the EU as a whole, deviations of national governments from the national parliamentary mean may cancel each other out. If left and right governments are balanced in the Council, we would not be able to observe any aggregate electoral effect in the party complexion of the EP (assuming voters predominantly cast national protest votes): Left governments would be punished by vote gains for right parties in EP elections and vice versa. However, even in the case of close left-right CoGs, the Council should be ideologically more coherent than the parties in all national parliaments, given that national governments represent ideologically more coherent subsets of the number of parties in parliament. For the same reason, it should also be more coherent than the European Parliament.
Are these expectations borne out by the data? Figure 3 reports CoG estimates for Council, national parliaments, and EP in the left-right dimension since 1979. Our first finding is that the party-political center of the Council has not actually fluctuated randomly in relation to the position of the national parliaments but has deviated in a systematic, almost cyclical way.
The data confirm what we already know from anecdotal evidence: a dominance of conservative governments in the 1980s and the return to power of Social Democratic parties in the second half of the 1990s. The CoG of national governments (i.e., of the Council) has differed quite substantially from the CoG of national parliaments. The political location of the European Parliament by and large lends support to the second-order election thesis: The 1980s, with rather conservative member-state governments, saw a relatively left Parliament; in the 1990s, Council and Parliament changed-now a relatively left Council is confronted by a Parliament positioned more moderately. Also, the systematic deviation of the EP CoG from member-state parliaments' CoGs provides support for the thesis that voters in European elections obviously cast protest votes against their national governments.
Our data also confirm that the Council is indeed ideologically more homogenous than the EP. We have calculated the standard deviation for each observation as a measurement of the cohesiveness of Council and EP. Obviously, national governments are less internally divided (mean value of the standard deviations for the CoGs of all governments = 0.65) than their national parliaments (1.87) . Above, we also discussed how the dominance of center parties in the process of domestic government formation creates a more homogeneous Council compared to all national parliaments and the EP. The calculated standard deviations for all the parties in the Council (1.69), for all parties in all EU member-state parliaments (2.10), and for all the parties in the EP (2.19) bear out our expectations.
Consider now the pro-/contra-integration dimension. We have argued that the mechanical effects that accompany the translation of domestic votes into Council seats are likely to make the Council more integrationfriendly than national parliaments-at least this is what the theoretical and empirical work on coalition formation in Western Europe would suggest. We know that parties in the center of the left-right spectrum are more likely to be represented in government coalitions. Therefore, fewer extreme parties are to be found in West European governments than are represented in EU-member-state parliaments. Given that we also know that more extreme parties tend to be more EU-skeptic, the representation of national governments in the EU is very likely to have a pro-European bias to it. A comparison between the CoGs of national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the Council in the sovereignty-integration dimension indeed strongly confirms our hypothesis (Figure 4) . Figure 4 shows that as expected, the Council has been on average systematically more EU-friendly than the national parliaments. But Figure 4 displays an additional important finding: EP elections produce a European Parliament that is even considerably more EU-skeptic than the national parliaments are. Whether the more integration-skeptic position of the European parliament is only a by-product of European elections, in which voting decisions are largely driven by domestic political concerns, or whether it reflects vote choices that themselves take the pro-EU bias of the Council already into account is an interesting question that we cannot, however, answer here.
Once we focus on the internal cohesiveness or homogeneity of the EU institutions in the integration-independence dimension, we again find our expectations confirmed. The Council (1.03) is more coherent than all parties in national parliaments (1.37) , and the European Parliament is even more divergent (1.53) on the integration-independence dimension than all parties in all member-state parliaments taken together.
Our findings seem to contradict the received wisdom of the literature, in which the Council is pictured as a bulwark of national interest whereas both Parliament and Commission are seen as very much integration oriented, often forming pro-European coalitions against the reluctant member states. Of course it seems reasonable to assume that on the sovereignty-integration dimension, members of the European Parliament tend to be preference outliers within their respective parties; that is, they are likely to be more EUfriendly than the median member of parliament or average member of their own party. Therefore it might be misleading to derive the EP's CoG using indicators that measure the location of parties in domestic politics. Yet there are limits for outliers. Serious party-internal divisions over the course of European integration endanger party credibility and party identity, and a party risks sending ambiguous signals to voters when its European members of parliament deviate systematically from the party's domestic line. It also risks losing votes in EP elections (cf. Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004) . There exist clear domestic constraints on party positions on Europe: In general, parties "seek EU policies that are in line with their electoral commitments, accord with domestic public opinion, or directly benefit their voters and supporting interest groups" (Hix, 2005, p. 409) .
Moreover, the common perceptions of the EP's integration-friendly position may be distorted, because we often tend to regard the joint position of the two dominating party groups within the European Parliament, the European People's Party / Party of European Socialists, as the position of the Parliament as a whole. In this respect, our study's findings are also relevant to the understanding of coalition politics in the European Parliament. Students of coalition behavior in the European Parliament emphasize the need to form grand coalitions given the supermajorities required in the legislative decision processes (cf. Kreppel, 2000, p. 346) . Our findings suggest that not only formal majority requirements but also actual majorities may have been important. Given that the Council is composed mostly of parties that are closer to the mean left-right position and thereby more integration-friendly than the Parliament, a two-dimensional perspective on likely coalitions in the EP will predict that coalitions in the EP will be closer to the mean as well. In contrast to national political systems, where majority coalitions significantly left or right of the parliament's position can be formed, we expect a bias toward parties close to the mean. Speaking in the terms of formal models, the median legislator is more likely to select other legislators to the left and right of his position than to use all the legislators either left or right to his position to form a majority.
Conclusions
Is divided government the norm in the EU? As we have shown, the question can be answered only by distinguishing between mechanical effects of vote aggregation on one hand and the effects of electoral behavior in European elections on the other. We have found evidence for the claim of electoral effects when looking at the positions of Council and European Parliament in the left-right dimension since 1979. The EP during the 1980s was on average, more left than the Council, where conservative governments dominate. Since the mid-1990s, the EP has become more conservative, whereas the Council first comprised a majority of left member-state governments and has lately shifted back to the conservative side. Differences in the left-right dimension, however, seem not as marked to justify speaking of "opposed majorities" between Council and European Parliament. However, we have found more important, more persistent, and more marked differences between Council and EP in the second salient dimension of European politics: the pro-/contra-EU or integrationsovereignty dimension. Here, we seem to be confronted with a composite effect of the mechanics of vote aggregation on one hand and vote choices in European elections on the other. More extreme parties are less likely to be represented in national governments, because of the centrist logic of national government formation, and more likely to be represented in the EP, because of the more extreme vote choices of voters who take part in EP elections.
Our findings speak to three different literatures: (a) the literature on EP elections, (b) the debate on Europe's democratic deficit, and (c) studies on legislative politics within the EU and on coalition formation within the EP.
Our empirical evidence questions previous interpretations of EP elections, which see European elections as being no more than national elections in disguise. As has been noted above, the relatively poor performance of government parties in EP elections does not necessarily point to the secondorder status of European elections, because there is a straightforward European interpretation to this (Bartolini, 2005, p. 343) . With respect to the second-order thesis, our study suggests the possibility of an alternative interpretation. The strong empirical evidence for the success of small parties in EP elections (Kousser, 2004 ) may be explained with the policy positions of these parties. Small parties may be more successful in these elections not because of their size but because of their more skeptical attitude toward European integration. This implies that in the pro-/contra-EU dimension, the electoral causes of divided government may not be fully independent of the mechanical causes. There is a possible analogy to Duverger's law here: We might observe "psychological" effects in European voting behavior that react to the mechanical effects in the preference aggregation from national parliaments to national governments to the European Council. EP election outcomes would then have to be explained, at least in part, as the manifestation of "electoral overshooting" (Kedar, 2005) . This suggests that reassessing EP election outcomes in the light of the overshooting thesis might be a worthwhile enterprise.
The empirical evidence presented here is also relevant to the debate on Europe's democratic deficit. One argument often made in this debate, which even strong critics of an integration process dominated by national executives seem to have accepted, is that the EU integration process is-if only indirectly-democratically legitimized, because all member states in the EU are, of course, democratically elected (Moravcsik, 2002) . However, as we have shown in the preceding paragraphs, national governments represent citizens' preferences with respect to the course of European integration only imperfectly and in a systematically biased way. This puts sanguine perspectives of Europe's democratic deficit into doubt. If we expect from political institutions that they should create congruence between citizens and representatives (McDonald & Budge, 2005; Powell, 2000) , then European political institutions seem to fail to accomplish this congruence in one important dimension.
Finally, the literature on legislative politics within the EU and on coalition formation within the EP may benefit from systematically taking into account the relative policy distances between the major political actors. Although previous contributions have devoted quite some effort to locating political actors in an issue-specific space, more systematic information about policy distances might be derived from locating EU institutions in Europe's two-dimensional political space. Once the focus is on EU legislative politics, voting rules in Council and Parliament must enter the analysis. Our study was primarily interested in questions of representation, that is, in how national and European votes get translated into seats in the Council and the European Parliament and whether the dominant party political orientation of both bodies tends to diverge. Analyzing how the party political composition interacts with the EU's formal decision rules would be a promising extension of our approach.
